War – in the popular sense, a conflict between political groups involving warfare of considerable duration and level.
War is close to the military, called the armed forces, are forces authorized to use deadly force, and weapons, to support the interests of the state and some or all of its citizens. The task of the military is usually defined as defense of the state and its citizens, and the prosecution of war against another state. The military may also have additional sanctioned and non-sanctioned functions within a society, including, the promotion of a political agenda, protecting corporate economic interests, internal population control, construction, emergency services, social ceremonies, and guarding important areas. Therefore, military writers usually confine the term to warfare in which the contending groups are sufficiently equal in power to render the outcome uncertain for a time. Armed conflicts of powerful states with isolated and powerless peoples are usually called pacification, military expeditions, or explorations; with small states, they are called interventions or reprisals; and with internal groups, rebellions or insurrections. Such incidents, if the resistance is sufficiently strong or protracted, may achieve a level that entitles them to the name “War”. Collaboration is basically a form of unified weaponry on a larger national scale, where reciprocal forces of the military, navy, air and foreign forces are intended to cooperate in joint activities, as opposed to organizing and executing military tasks separate from one another. The United States Department of Defense, which advocates joint war as a principle that undermines its strength, describes it as a ‘Group War’, which requires coordinated use of each of its capabilities. The country’s need for solidarity implies that joint combat experts must recognize the importance of organizational processes, including requirements, capabilities, and others such as the knowledge administration in military arrangements. On the other side, national defense reflecting the country to defend its strategic interests and maintain national security. Defense outlines the three main base, the country’s strategic interests, the principles of defense and defense concepts. It can emphasize the need to maintain the strategic importance of the environment of a stable and secure.
In Malaysia, the area’s strategic importance can be seen from the three levels of the immediate area, regional and global.
First is the immediate area, including land area, territorial waters, airspace, the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Straits of Malacca and the entrance gate, and the Straits of Singapore as well as lines of communication that links the sea and air Peninsular Malaysia with Sabah and Sarawak. Second, the region is considered important by Malaysia covers East Asia, including the Andaman Islands and the South China Sea. Malaysia sees the developments in the region will also affect security and development. This is important for Malaysia to share land or sea borders, or both, with almost all ASEAN member countries. Any disruption to the region’s security, whether in the form of internal 2 conflict and external region the region, will have an impact on national security. Third, the national trade ties growing, new markets for its products, increasing foreign investment and the acquisition of private companies with interests throughout the world, has broadened its interests beyond the immediate area and regional. Based on this, it is a national interest to ensure peace is maintained. Taking into account the strategic importance of factors and competing interests, Malaysia’s defense revolves around the fundamental principles of Self-Reliance, Regional Cooperation, and Foreign Aid.
From the history side, The Seven Years’ War – known as the French and Indian War in North America – determined which country was the dominant power outside Europe. It also ruled that English would be the dominant world language. In addition, it was the first instance in which a naval force projected a long-range ground force, supported them, and prevented the enemy from being reinforced. Historians argue that the fate of North America was decided on the Abrahamic Plains when Wolfe defeated Montcalm. In fact, British troops occupied Quebec City spent the winter, almost starving and under threat from French invaders in the region. The ability to use land and sea power together with large maritime capabilities allowed the British government to survive the strategic and political uncertainties demonstrated in its war against American invaders in the 1770s. The control of the sea and the ability to expand power could hardly overcome the mistake made by Lord Frederick North. Despite displaying a great army across the Atlantic, the British could not withstand the independence movement. The capture of New York in 1776 – through actual joint operations – and the attack on New Jersey almost destroyed the revolutionary army. However, General George Washington and his army survived, and the following year’s campaign, which launched the British under Sir William Howe against Philadelphia also left General John Burgoyne’s New York invasion in hardship, leading to the defeat at Saratoga. It dies when other forces intervene. However, the unity of land and sea extended the British control of the Caribbean to India over a large coalition. One of the issues that the administration is still in control of the plan. Subsequently, co-ordinated directives put the ability on their to-do list, for example, driverless vehicles (drones), electronic counter-machines, and different levels of knowledge management, observation, and surveillance. Administrators funded the project until the Pentagon described capabilities such as ‘extreme, low thickness.’ The inability to keep things as simple as adding to the task is only a side effect of the basic issues in the Army. Equally, the shared culture does not include the views of the public and the employees who cooperate. Without that perspective, those who are working on a common task think that it is difficult to come up with ideas that make sense for how one can truly use innovation to fight for the future. Collaborative culture relies on complex components – instruction, operating experience, and a deep understanding of individual administrative capabilities.
While Goldwater-Nichols history is raising the glory of the shared billet, the government needs to push the most outgoing supervise through a limited number of positions to be eligible and satisfactory for progress. This implies that most of the attempts at trying out the foundations of the world together, hardly enough to be effective in their work, far outweigh the broader view of collective activity. Barriers to the present workforce framework for collective culture are further exacerbated by the general inability to pay attention to skilled military instruction. Moreover, U.S. Joint Command needs to fill that space. Of course, it has a mission that can be certified in lieu of the ATA Atlantic Government. Appropriately, it will generally put its best organizations in careers that do not include experimentation or idea progression. The Joint Staff, headed by the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense, is also responsible for the development of the joint idea. In any case, it is destroyed by everyday activities that believe that the past (in the box) believes almost beyond belief. This issue adds to the weak shared network typically owned by two-year-old officers for all intents and purposes with no way of doing anything other than being efficient in their job. The prospect of changing this situation does not seem to fit the reason that no senior official in the world or administration is ready to interpret the highly framed and happy faculty framework. The past three centuries have seen progress in joint warfare, at a constant expense in combat zones. However, military history since World War II has emphasized the basic task of fighting together. If the Armed Forces use new developments indefinitely, they should encourage bona fide unions depending on expert thinking and training. As Michael Howard suggests, war is not only the most important physical calling, it is a mental addiction. This is the last point that military members need to develop. Collaborative warfare must be based on ideas that can provide brain flexibility and future demand.
To reinforce that statement, one recommended approach to creating a shared culture is inevitable is to destroy the administrative community. One of the common ways to deal with activities is to understand the opposite of a medium: land, sea, or air. So the officers became war elements and they were the start of a war. In this way, the administration, the community must make warriors who truly accept their own milieus, provided that they do not, they cannot directly add to their whereabouts. At the core of the issue that pervades the common culture is the framework of the military faculty built in the 1940s. Experiencing change is more likely to be the only side effect of this issue. One of the motivations behind this framework was to cause damage to the corps of officers during the intervening period. A distinctive mind captures the uncertain courses of progress. The framework is still in place today with the aim of urging officials to resign between the ages of 41 and 45. Moreover, Congress just like the administration has introduced prerequisites for progress. The latest is the importance of collective responsibility in thinking for the advancement of public servants. This provision at Goldwater-Nichols is intended to address organizational issues that refuse to send their best staff to the Joint Staff. Even the officers face many prerequisites for progress, including mutual obligations. The faculty framework of the 1940s did not take into account the complexity of training and innovation. However, the framework intended for the military in the mechanical age is still fundamental. The results have largely deprived the adjustment staff of expert repair beyond the limited career track.
As an independent and sovereign country, Malaysia is aware that the most appropriate measures to safeguard the interests and national security are through the pursuit of self-reliance that is the core of its defense policy. This principle emphasizes self-reliance in the Armed Forces structure of national self-reliance. It involves not only combat forces but also the logistical support network of military-industrial cooperation in line with national development priorities. In this context, self-reliance should not be limited to military efforts alone but should involve all relevant government agencies and the people. However, taking into the limits, national self-reliance is generally based on two runways. First, have the ability to act independently without external assistance in matters concerning internal security, and second, have the ability to act independently of its territorial integrity and security interests within the immediate vicinity of the external threats of low and intermediate level. Because of its geographical location in the middle of Southeast Asia, could not help the strategic interests of Malaysia has close ties with countries in the region to another. Based on this position, the security of Malaysia is part of the security of member countries of ASEAN. Thus, any threat to Malaysia is also seen as a threat to ASEAN. Accordingly, Malaysia gives priority to regional cooperation. In the context of regional cooperation, Malaysia also encourages the establishment of bilateral defense cooperation among the countries of ASEAN. A network of bilateral defense cooperation with ASEAN countries will assist in the process of building confidence and promoting transparency. In line with this approach, Malaysia will promote and contribute to the development of a strong and effective ASEAN to ensure the security of Southeast Asia.
We can see Malaysia is to see the establishment of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ASEAN Regional Forum – ARF) as a significant development towards sustainable peace and regional stability. The initiative by ASEAN has successfully brought together participants to share views on common security concerns. The dialogue process has proven to be an important mechanism to build confidence. ARF activities will foster more intimate cooperation and better understanding among ARF participants. To complement the efforts of regional cooperation, Malaysia is also aware of the need for external assistance from countries outside the region. The assistance includes support for moral and physical training facilities, technology transfer and supply of equipment. Towards this effort, it has taken steps to establish and reinforce relations with countries outside the region. Although the country is responsible for the principles of The Peace, Independent, and Impartial (ZOPFAN), this should not be the need to seek assistance from sources outside the region. This is especially so when the threat is beyond the capability of the local force. Malaysia considers the rules of Five National Defence (FPDA), which comprises Singapore, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and 5 Malaysia as a gateway to obtain foreign aid. FPDA is the only form of formal rules involving the defense of Malaysia and other countries outside the region. At its inception, the country realized that self-reliance requires a certain period of time to achieve. Hence, the FPDA has become a channel for Malaysia to develop defense capabilities with the help of partner countries that have long-established relations with Malaysia. The pattern of consultation mechanisms open to the FPDA countries to obtain foreign aid and security guarantees. Malaysia is committed to the establishment of the FPDA remains relevant. However, the strategic scenario and the enhanced ability of the Malaysian Armed Forces (ATM), the role of FPDA has been restructured to reflect current needs. Malaysian firm commitment to the United Nations Charter requires the establishment of the country subscribes to a form of defensive defense. In this regard, defense policy has been to formulate strategies based on the principle of resistance and prevent the overall defense. However, this policy outlines the need to prevent conflict in their own territory, either by preventing it from happening or by engaging the enemy as far as possible outside the territory of Malaysia. Justification of the concept aims is to prevent resistance to prevent potential enemies from adopting policies that conflict with peaceful conflict resolution measures. This requires the implementation of preventive strategies as well as efforts to develop a military that has a strong capacity to face the war. This will ensure that the country has the ability to prevent such acts of force or violence by opponents. The concept of a comprehensive defense-related with total and integrated efforts undertaken by the Government, non-governmental agencies, private sector, and citizens to defend the country. Preservation of the integrity and sovereignty of Malaysia requires the commitment of all citizens and not just the Armed Forces. While the defense of the country is the responsibility of the security forces, the duty to ensure that the team is able to withstand the challenges of national responsibility.
In conclusion, war is a military resolution that places the need to bring different organizational divisions of the country’s military into one direction. Although it recognizes the importance of regional cooperation and external assistance, Malaysia believes that self-reliance should continue to be the cornerstone of national defense. The collaboration between other country is basically a form of unified weaponry on a larger national scale, where the integrated forces of the state, navy, air, and superpower are intended to cooperate in joint activities, rather than organize and carry out the military task that is separate from each other. In this regard, Malaysia will continue to work towards enhancing and developing the capacity of ATM as well as promoting awareness of defense and patriotism among the people.
- History. Com Editors, November 9, 2009, French and India War, History.
- Joint Publication 1-02, 15 February 2016, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, page 364-365.
- Laura Racchio, April 3, 2020, Wind of Change: Defect of the Spanish Armada 1588, from https://landsat.gsfc.nasa.gov/winds-of-change-defeat-of-the-spanish-armada-1588/
- History. Com Editors, February 9, 2010, Spanish Armada Defeated, History.
- Anniina Jokinen, September 28, 2006, The Spanish Armada 1588, from http://www.luminarium.org/encyclopedia/armada.htm
- George Washington; Defeated at the Battle of Long Island, June 200, American History Magazine.